some published and unpublished work
|epistemology||philosophy of mind||emotions & imagination||ethics||language||other|
list of my publications
Precis and contents of Bounded Thinking: epistemic virtues for limited agents OUP, 2012. Analytical epistemology marries descriptive decision theory and their offspring solves problems of bounded cognition.
Acting to Know. Synthese, to appear. Experimentation as a special case of doing something in order to know something.
Contrastive Knowledge (in M Blaauw, ed. Contrastivism in Philosophy.) What is gained by taking knowledge as contrastive.
Human Bounds (Synthese 2010 - issue on bounded rationality). Why giving advice about coping with our limits is different from finding the best ways of coping with them.
Knowing what to think about: when epistemology meets the theory of choice in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Hetherington, Oxford University Press. (pdf)
If you’re so smart why are you ignorant (Analysis, 2002) Epistemic analogs of causal decision theory, even of Newcomb’s paradox.
virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity (Nous 38,
2004) Limitations on our ability to think givereasons for describing ourselves in terms of cognitive virtues instead
of justified beliefs.
Contrastivity and indistinguishability (Social Epistemology 2008) Contrastive attitudes in general
Saving epistemology from the epistemologists (British J. for the Phil. of Science, 1999) survey article.
review of John Hawthorne Knowledge and Lotteries Philosophical Quarterly 2005
review of Ernest Sosa Knowing Full Well. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (link)
Precis and contents of Emotion and Imagination, Polity Press, 2013. Imagining points of view gives us such a range of emotions, among them moral emotions, and among these undesirable moral emotions such as smugness and priggery. A small book that began as a collection of papers.
Imaginary Emotions (The Monist, to appear) We imagine and ascribe emotions that do not exist.
Surprise (to appear in Todd and Roeser, Emotion and Value) The value of the emotion of surprise, and of our lack of surprise that surprising things happen.
Imagination and misimagination (in Shaun Nichols, ed. The Architecture of the Imagination.) Imaginative perspective, imagination versus misimagination, fiction.
Empathy for the devil (in Peter Goldie and Amy Coplan, eds. Empathy.Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives) How we can imagine evil actions, and why decent people find it difficult.
Beware Stories (in Peter
Goldie, ed. Understanding Emotions Ashgate 2001) Emotions are closely
related to virtues, but there are important contrasts between
Emotional Accuracy (half of a Joint Session symposium, 2002, with Ronald de Sousa). Emotions are not true or false, but they can be accurate or inaccurate with respect to situations.
review of Ronald de Sousa Emotional Truth (Philosophical Quarterly 2011)
Good neighours and moral heroes (in Pedro Tabensky, ed. The positive function of evil) There is no such thing as an all-round good person, because the perfect neighbour may not be what you need in a real crisis
Moral incompetence (in Values and Virtues, edited by T.J. Chappell.) Often good people produce terrible results, and one reason is moral incompetence.
The disunity of
the moral Morality is many different
Bad versus evil Some of the conclusions of my book On Evil