an essay on pitch perception
A Solution to the Donkey Sentence Problem: 'All' but neither universal nor existential. Analysis 2015
Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the role of unworthy epistemic emotions
Empathy and Imagination: how to be nice to people without faking understanding of them
other essays: mostly political, less connected to my main research (so from a more fragile background.)
the damage project
for the project the papers and their topics, with links
-- pride versus Self-Respect: injuries to self-respect are a special kind of harm, different from injuries to pride
-- damage and imagination some kinds of harm are hard to imagine
-- cousins of regret how factoring in damage affects retrospctive emotions
-- damage, fllourishing, and two sides of morality fitting damage to rules of conduct suggests that these are not a tight unity
and contents of Bounded
Thinking: epistemic virtues for limited agents OUP,
2012. Analytical epistemology marries descriptive decision theory and
their offspring solves problems of bounded cognition.
Human Bounds (Synthese 2010) giving advice about coping with our limits is different from finding the best ways of coping with them.
Lockhart's Problem (the Philosophers' Magazine 2014) if we were smarter would we be more or less puzzled?
knowledge and accomplishment
radical symmetry between belief and action.
Accomplishing Accomplishment (Acta Analytica 2011) Consequences of the symmetry.
review of Ernest Sosa Knowing Full Well. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (link)
what to think about: when epistemology meets the theory of choice in
by Stephen Hetherington, Oxford University Press. (pdf)
Acting to Know Synthese, to appear. Experimentation as a special case of doing something in order to know something.
Contrastive Knowledge (in M Blaauw, .ed. Contrastivism in Philosophy.) What is gained by taking knowledge as contrastive.
Contrastive Knowledge (Philosophical Explorations, May 2003 -with Antti Karjalainen) "a knows that p rather than q" is often less puzzling than "a knows that p".
Contrastivity and indistinguishability (Social Epistemology 2008) Contrastive attitudes in general
epistemic virtues and emotions
Surprise (to appear in Todd and Roeser, Emotion and Value): the value of the emotion of surprise, and of our lack of surprise that surprising things happen.
Shared knowledge from individual vice (Philosophical Inquiries 2014) epistemic vices are good for us.
Great expectations: virtues presupposed by different kinds of risk. how a profitable gamble can be worse for most people who take it.
Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity (Nous 38, 2004): limitations on our ability to think give reasons for describing ourselves in terms of cognitive virtues instead of justified beliefs
Evidence-based beliefs (Know, 2017) Experimental evidence is the best kind, but our practice of it is sometimes problematic.
If you’re so smart why are you ignorant (Analysis, 2002): epistemic analogs of causal decision theory, even of Newcomb’s paradox.
Saving epistemology from the epistemologists (British J. for the Phil. of Science, 1999) survey article.
review of John Hawthorne Knowledge and Lotteries Philosophical Quarterly 2005
metaphysics of emotions
and contents of Emotion
Polity Press, 2013.
Imagining points of view gives us such a range of emotions, among
them moral emotions, and among these undesirable moral emotions such
as smugness and priggery. A small book that began as a
collection of papers.
Pride versus Self-Respect: injuries to self-respect are a special kind of harm, different from injuries to pride
Imaginary Emotions (The Monist, to appear) We imagine and ascribe emotions that do not exist.
Imagination and misimagination (in Shaun Nichols, ed. The Architecture of the Imagination.) Imaginative perspective, imagination versus misimagination, fiction
Beware Stories (in Peter Goldie, ed. Understanding Emotions Ashgate 2001) Emotions are closely related to virtues, but there are important contrasts between them.
Emotional Accuracy (half of a Joint Session symposium, 2002, with Ronald de Sousa). Emotions are not true or false, but they can be accurate or inaccurate with respect to situations.
review of Ronald de Sousa Emotional Truth (Philosophical Quarterly 2011)
Precis and contents of Emotion and Imagination, Polity Press, 2013. Imagining points of view gives us such a range of emotions, among them moral emotions, and among these undesirable moral emotions such as smugness and priggery. Parts III and IV are about emotions in moral life.
Empathy and Imagination : how to be nice to people without faking understanding of them.
Empathy for the devil (in Peter Goldie and Amy Coplan, eds. Empathy.Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives) How we can imagine evil actions, and why decent people find it difficult.
Surprise (in Todd and Roeser, Emotion and Value) The value of the emotion of surprise, and of our lack of surprise that surprising things happen.
On Evil precis and contents of the book (Routledge 2004).
Bad versus evil text of a talk with some of the conclusions of On Evil
disunity of the moral
Good neighours and moral heroes (in Pedro Tabensky, ed. The positive function of evil) There is no such thing as an all-round good person, because the perfect neighbour may not be what you need in a real crisis
The disunity of the moral Morality is many different things.
Moral incompetence (in Values and Virtues, edited by T.J. Chappell.) Often good people produce terrible results, and one reason is moral incompetence.
philosophy of mind
an essay on pitch perception: describing without ostension what it is like to hear a distinction, in a way that makes it easier to hear it
But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology: commentary on papers in a XPhi issue of the Journal of Cognition and Culture
folk psychology does not exist (in D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe eds Folk Psychology Reassessed) So have I been working on a myth, all these years?
From tracking relations to propositional attitudes European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2009. Propositional attitudes may not be basic in our concept of mind.
A Solution to the Donkey Sentence Problem: 'A' but neither universal nor existential. Analysis 2015
review of Yablo Aboutness (longer version than appeared in NDPR)
Skookumchuck, Kiidk'yaas, Gibbard: normativity, meaning, and idealisation: review article of Allan Gibbard's Meaning and Normativity
Against the Ramsey Test (Analysis, 2004) We don't evaluate indicative conditionals in terms of conditional probability. (pdf)
Indicative versus subjunctive in future conditionals (Analysis, 2004) There are both indicative and subjunctive future-tense conditionals. and sometimes the same words can be used to express both.
Suppose, suppose (Analysis, 1993) The embedding of one conditional in anothe.
Where demonstratives meet vagueness My Aristotelian Society presidential address. Ttwo unpopular views. (a) there are deep connections between vagueness and demonstratives, and (b) we can clarify some basic aspects of language by considering invented natural languages.
Mathematics as language (in Benacerraf and his Critics, Blackwell 1996) Another experimental piece exploring the idea that we can learn something about how we understand language by considering our grasp of the non-natural symbol systems used in mathematics.
Gibbard's principle of commitment (unpublished) a note criticising the central move of Allan Gibbard's Thinking how to Live. (See also my reviewe article of Gibbard under 'language' above.)
Felosophy Cat philosophy!
Philosophy as engineering (from Mo Bou, ed. Two Roads to Wisdom?
the party-goers guide to philosophy
Did Lewis Carroll write Genesis?
hard to get
Mathematical modelling and contrastive explanation (CJP supp vol 16, 1990: hard to find in libraries) (html)
Disasters and Dilemmas (out of print)
PhilPapers list of my publications
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