|in general||bounded cognition||moral||disunity||language|
|knowledge & accomplishment||metaphysics of||evil||mind
epistemic virtues & emotions
|moral virtues||popular, light-hearted|
|c.v.||list of all my publications||PhilPapers list of my publications||recent||hard to get|
review of Ernest Sosa Knowing Full Well. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (link)
about: when epistemology meets the theory of choice in
edited by Stephen Hetherington, Oxford University
Acting to Know Synthese, to appear. Experimentation as a special case of doing something in order to know something.
Contrastive Knowledge (in M Blaauw, .ed. Contrastivism in Philosophy.) What is gained by taking knowledge as contrastive.
Contrastivity and indistinguishability (Social Epistemology 2008) Contrastive attitudes in general
Surprise (to appear in Todd and Roeser, Emotion and Value): the value of the emotion of surprise, and of our lack of surprise that surprising things happen.
Shared knowledge from individual vice (Philosophical Inquiries 2014) epistemic vices are good for us.
Great expectations: virtues presupposed by different kinds of risk. how a profitable gamble can be worse for most people who take it.
Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity (Nous 38, 2004): limitations on our ability to think give reasons for describing ourselves in terms of cognitive virtues instead of justified beliefs
If you’re so smart why are you ignorant (Analysis, 2002): epistemic analogs of causal decision theory, even of Newcomb’s paradox.
Saving epistemology from the epistemologists (British J. for the Phil. of Science, 1999) survey article.
Imaginary Emotions (The Monist, to appear) We imagine and ascribe emotions that do not exist.
Imagination and misimagination (in Shaun Nichols, ed. The Architecture of the Imagination.) Imaginative perspective, imagination versus misimagination, fiction
Stories (in Peter
Goldie, ed. Understanding
Emotions Ashgate 2001) Emotions are closely
related to virtues, but there are important contrasts between
(half of a Joint Session symposium, 2002,
with Ronald de Sousa). Emotions are not true or false, but
they can be accurate or inaccurate with respect to situations.
review of Ronald de Sousa Emotional Truth (Philosophical Quarterly 2011)
Precis and contents of Emotion and Imagination, Polity Press, 2013. Imagining points of view gives us such a range of emotions, among them moral emotions, and among these undesirable moral emotions such as smugness and priggery. Parts III and IV are about emotions in moral life.
Empathy and Imagination : how to be nice to people without faking understanding of them.
Empathy for the devil (in Peter Goldie and Amy Coplan, eds. Empathy.Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives) How we can imagine evil actions, and why decent people find it difficult.
Surprise (in Todd and Roeser, Emotion and Value) The value of the emotion of surprise, and of our lack of surprise that surprising things happen.
On Evil precis and contents of the book (Routledge 2004).
Bad versus evil text of a talk with some of the conclusions of On Evil
Good neighours and moral heroes (in Pedro Tabensky, ed. The positive function of evil) There is no such thing as an all-round good person, because the perfect neighbour may not be what you need in a real crisis
The disunity of the moral Morality is many different things.
Moral incompetence (in Values and Virtues, edited by T.J. Chappell.) Often good people produce terrible results, and one reason is moral incompetence.
an essay on pitch perception: describing without ostension what it is like to hear a distinction, in a way that makes it easier to hear it
But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology: commentary on papers in a XPhi issue of the Journal of Cognition and Culture
folk psychology does not exist (in D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe eds Folk Psychology Reassessed) So have I been working on a myth, all these years?
From tracking relations to propositional attitudes European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2009. Propositional attitudes may not be basic in our concept of mind.
A Solution to the Donkey Sentence Problem: 'A' but neither universal nor existential. Analysis 2015
review of Yablo Aboutness (longer version than appeared in NDPR)
Skookumchuck, Kiidk'yaas, Gibbard: normativity, meaning, and idealisation: review article of Allan Gibbard's Meaning and Normativity
Against the Ramsey Test (Analysis, 2004) We don't evaluate indicative conditionals in terms of conditional probability. (pdf)
Indicative versus subjunctive in future conditionals (Analysis, 2004) There are both indicative and subjunctive future-tense conditionals. and sometimes the same words can be used to express both.
Suppose, suppose (Analysis, 1993) The embedding of one conditional in anothe.
Where demonstratives meet vagueness My Aristotelian Society presidential address. Ttwo unpopular views. (a) there are deep connections between vagueness and demonstratives, and (b) we can clarify some basic aspects of language by considering invented natural languages.
Mathematics as language (in Benacerraf and his Critics, Blackwell 1996) Another experimental piece exploring the idea that we can learn something about how we understand language by considering our grasp of the non-natural symbol systems used in mathematics.
Gibbard's principle of commitment (unpublished) a note criticising the central move of Allan Gibbard's Thinking how to Live. (See also my reviewe article of Gibbard under 'language' above.)
Philosophy as engineering (from Mo Bou, ed. Two Roads to Wisdom?
Mathematical modelling and contrastive explanation (CJP supp vol 16, 1990: hard to find in libraries) (html)